What Is Epistemology? by Barnett, Brian C.
Introduction to the Book:  
What Is Epistemology? 
Brian C. Barnett 
Part I ​–​ Traditional Epistemology: Chapters 
1​–​4 
 
Epistemology​—as traditionally construed—is the 
study of knowledge. Its name derives from the Greek 
epistêmê​, which translates as “knowledge” or “understanding.” This study includes four main questions:  
 
● The What-Is-It Question: What ​is​ knowledge?  
● The Justification Question: What makes a belief reasonable or rational or ​justified​?  
● The Source Question: What are the ultimate sources of knowledge (or justification)? 
● The Scope Question: What, if anything, do (or can) we know?  
 
Part I of this volume covers each in turn. In Chapter 1, Brian C. Barnett analyzes knowledge (addressing 
the What-Is-It Question), beginning with Plato’s view that knowledge is “justified true belief” (to phrase 
it in standard modern terms). A justified belief is a belief backed by good reasons. More specifically, 
knowledge requires reasons that are indicative of the truth (as opposed to practical, aesthetic, or moral 
reasons). Truth-directed reasons (and the kind of justification they supply) are ​epistemic​, meaning that 
they pertain to knowledge.​ ​Epistemic justification receives special attention in epistemology, in part 
because it is the component of knowledge unique to the field—in contrast to truth and belief, which are 
topics shared by other philosophical domains (truth in the philosophy of language and logic, belief in the 
philosophy of mind).  
The What-Is-It Question thus leads directly to the Justification Question. In Chapter 2, Todd R. Long 
theorizes about epistemic justification, including ​internalist ​theories (on which justification is 
determined solely by factors internal to the mind) and ​externalist​ theories (which admit factors external 
to the mind). Internalists and externalists alike typically recognize both reason and experience as 
justificatory sources. But does all justification ultimately bottom out in one fundamental source? 
The Source Question dominated much of Early Modern British philosophy. In Chapter 3, K.S. Sangeetha 
referees the classic debate between ​empiricists​ (who take experience to be primary) and ​rationalists 
(who posit an innate rational capacity prior to experience), culminating in Immanuel Kant’s synthesis of 
the two positions. Debates over the interpretation and success of Kant’s view triggered the (in)famous 
analytic-continental split in philosophy.  Relatedly, post-Kantian debates were partly responsible for 1
reinvigorating an ancient position: ​skepticism​—significant doubt about our capacity for knowledge (or 
justification). This takes us to the Scope Question. 
Skepticism comes in a variety of forms, ranging from ​domain-specific​ (doubts about, for example, 
religious or moral knowledge) to ​global skepticism​ (the view that we know nothing at all). In Chapter 4, 
1 See Jones (2009) for a brief overview of the analytic-continental split. 
Daniel Massey spotlights an influential intermediate form: skepticism about a mind-independent world. 
After explaining the most popular argument for this ​external-world skepticism​ (owing to René 
Descartes), Massey assesses two prominent strategies for being skeptical about such skepticism. 
Part II ​–​ Expanded Epistemology: Chapters 5​–​8 
A familiar fact about philosophy is that answers tend to generate further questions. Traditional 
epistemology is no exception. New puzzles emerged directly from the traditional project. New questions 
also emerged when connections were established between epistemology and other areas of thought 
(both inside and outside of philosophy). Moreover, some epistemologists grew dissatisfied with 
traditional assumptions and priorities. These developments did not displace traditional epistemology as 
much as expand it. Part II of the volume is devoted to this expanded epistemology.  
The traditional boundaries were stretched in several directions or “turns” (not to suggest that any of 
them were discipline-wide or in clear historical succession). The ​value turn​ in epistemology revived 
Plato’s original motivation for pursuing the What-Is-It Question: to explain why knowledge is valuable. 
The expanded goal is to explain ​epistemic value​ generally (including the value of truth, justification, 
inquiry, and intellectual virtue). A full account of epistemic value must address the relationship between 
it and value in other domains (e.g., practical, aesthetic, and moral). This brings into close dialogue 
epistemology and ethics, at the intersection of which lies the debate over the “ethics of belief.” Guy 
Axtell navigates these normative issues in Chapter 5. 
While some seek to connect epistemology with ethics, others prefer to make epistemology more 
rigorous by importing “formal” methods from linguistics, logic, and mathematics. An important 
development in this ​formal turn​ linked justification with the degree to which one’s belief is made 
probable by the evidence, which can be modeled by formulae (e.g., Bayes’ Theorem) in the 
mathematical theory of probability. Applying this idea to empirical hypothesis testing results in a theory 
of scientific confirmation, which can be utilized in the philosophy of science. Jonathan Lopez 
“formalizes” epistemology and examines its scientific application in Chapter 6.  
Formal and value-driven epistemology initially inherited from traditional epistemology its focus on 
individuals considered in the abstract. This idealization ignores that people are epistemically affected by 
their social situatedness. We exchange knowledge with others, disagree with one another, and engage 
in collaborative inquiry and decision-making. Accounting for social dimensions yields the ​social turn​ in 
epistemology. William D. Rowley lays the foundations of ​social epistemology​ in Chapter 7.  
In its early phases, even social epistemology ignored ​epistemic standpoint​—how one’s ​social location 
(e.g., gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, culture, religion, dis/ability, economic status) influences 
one’s perspective on the world. Standpoint is epistemically significant because it shapes experience, 
how one thinks, the information to which one has access, how others judge one’s credibility, etc. 
Although feminist epistemologists brought standpoint to the fore, their work can provide a framework 
for epistemologies from a range of social locations. For this reason, we may take ​feminist epistemologies 
(plural) as representative, extending beyond feminist perspectives. Monica C. Poole concludes this 
volume in Chapter 8 with an introduction to feminist epistemologies broadly construed.  
As epistemology expanded, real-world applications became increasingly apparent. While 
epistemologists historically fixated on highly theoretical questions far removed from real life, some 
recent work attends to everyday problems: political/religious/moral disagreement, fake news, echo 
chambers, discerning experts from novices, ignorance-induced discrimination, communal standards for 
inquiry, and more. Since applied issues are best considered together with the epistemological theories 
suited to address them, this ​applied turn​ is exemplified not in its own chapter, but via examples that 
occur throughout this volume.  
Epistemology Reconstrued 
It should be clear by now that the expanded project far outstrips the traditional one. What, then, should 
we say epistemology is, exactly? Unfortunately, the traditional definition remains in common usage. But 
should philosophers of justification, inquiry, or understanding be expelled from the epistemological 
community if they don’t also philosophize about knowledge per se? Surely not. Such philosophers 
consider themselves epistemologists, teach epistemology courses, give epistemology talks, publish in 
epistemology journals, and are counted as fellow epistemologists even by committed traditionalists. So, 
a more inclusive definition is desirable.  
The key plausibly lies in the recognition that all epistemologists study subjects ​related​ to knowledge in 
some​ respect or another, even if only loosely or indirectly. For example, justification is a condition on 
knowledge, inquiry aims at knowledge (or dispelling ignorance), intellectual virtues (e.g., understanding, 
curiosity, humility, and open-mindedness) facilitate inquiry, and there is epistemic value in all of these. 
Knowledge may therefore continue to serve as the touchstone for ​identifying​ the relevant topics, even 
though one needs ​neither to study​ ​nor to prioritize​ knowledge itself. This shift is subtle but crucial: 
Epistemology began as the study of knowledge, but it has become the study of the epistemic.  
 
Questions for Reflection 
 
1. The question “Does God exist?” is ​not​ an epistemological question. First explain why. Then identify 
four related questions that ​are​ epistemological—one for each of traditional epistemology’s four 
main questions. 
 
2. Consider two scenarios: 
 
Scenario A: They believe that their favorite sports team will win the game—merely because they 
desperately want this to happen. 
 
Scenario B: They believe that their favorite sports team will win the game—because their team 
has a better track record than the other team. 
 
Only one of the two exhibits an ​epistemic​ reason for belief. Which one and why?  
 
3. Name and describe the four “turns” in the history of epistemology. How did they—both individually 
and collectively—transform the field?  
 
4. In what way is the shift from the traditional to the expanded definition of epistemology “subtle”? 





Epistêmê​:​ Greek word for “knowledge” or “understanding” from which the term “epistemology” 
derives. 
Epistemic:​ Pertaining to knowledge. 
Epistemology​: Branch of philosophy traditionally defined as the study of knowledge. However, many 
(though not all) epistemologists gradually deemphasized or abandoned the study of knowledge per se, 
focusing instead on other topics that nevertheless pertain to knowledge, even if only in some loose or 
indirect way. Expanding the traditional definition to accommodate this shift, epistemology can be 
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